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WORLD-POLITICS.

LONDON: ST. PETERSBURG: BERLIN: WASHINGTON.

LONDON, *July, 1905.*

WE in England felt, when the news of Mr. John Hay's death came, that America had lost her greatest Secretary of State, ourselves a friend whose staunchness was guaranteed by the perfection of his Americanism, and humanity a strong and laborious servant. The appeal that Mr. Roosevelt makes to the sentiments and opinions of England is, of course, wider and bolder than any that Mr. Hay made or could make. People who know nothing, and do not greatly care to know anything, about America are interested in Mr. Roosevelt and feel the attractiveness of his great, elemental personality. But for a right appreciation of Mr. Hay there were needed somewhat finer sensibilities and a more specialized knowledge; and these are not among the attributes of the masses in any country. The audience that Mr. Hay found in England was exclusively the best audience that England can provide, the most authoritative, the most experienced, the most capable of appraising him rightly as a man and a diplomatist. To have won as Mr. Hay completely won, not merely the esteem and admiration but also the affection of such a tribunal—a tribunal whose favorable judgments are not lightly given—cannot by any scale of international comparison be held a small achievement. The period of his Ambassadorship at the Court of St. James's was brief, a bare eighteen months; but it was long enough to make him known everywhere to London society and officialdom, and liked, more than liked, wherever he was known. The happy union in him of the virtuoso and the diplomat, the scholar and the man of affairs; the many-sidedness of his tastes, interests and experiences which made him, when he chose, a talker of such wide and entrancing compass; the singular sweetness of disposi-

tion that graced a character all strength and fire; his mellow and vivacious eloquence—all these qualities and gifts, as Mr. Choate would be the first to testify, made upon London an impression of peculiar distinction. That impression deepened with every year of his service as Secretary of State. To regard for the man was added a cordial and unstinted recognition of his merits as a statesman.

I do not at all exaggerate when I say that in English opinion Mr. Hay gave a new tone, a new breadth and a new character to American diplomacy; a new tone, by maintaining in his official intercourse with other Governments that scrupulous courtesy and sense of form which he observed in private life; a new breadth, by adding to the list of American interests questions, such as the Far-Eastern question, that had hitherto been supposed to lie beyond their scope; and a new character, by making his passion for international justice and fair-dealing the key-note of his policy.

Before Mr. Hay became Secretary of State, there were three main grounds on which American diplomacy used to be criticised. It used to be criticised for its narrowness, its entire absorption in purely American problems, and its indifference to the far greater issues of that outside world from which it affected to hold aloof. Secondly, the conduct of American diplomacy used to be criticised for its disregard of international decorum, and at times for its downright rudeness. Europe could never quite understand how so progressive a country as America could tolerate being represented in her dealings with foreign Governments by a man who behaved as Mr. Blaine behaved, or who wrote "shirt-sleeve" despatches, like Mr. Sherman, or who corresponded with another Power in the tone of an angry, hectoring lawyer, like Mr. Olney. Thirdly, it was a common reproach to American diplomats that they displayed too carelessly the huckstering spirit and that they seemed too insensible to the bigger view—a reproach, I take it, that had its origin in the nature of some of the claims submitted to the Geneva court of arbitration. All such criticisms, however, ceased directly Mr. Hay's policy and personality began to make themselves felt.

It very soon became evident, indeed, that Mr. Hay was a man to whom world-views came naturally, who neglected none of the formulas of diplomatic politeness and consideration, and

whose policy, so far from being petty, was inspired by a genuine humanitarianism not less than by an unswerving regard for American interests. Downing Street found it easy and delightful to negotiate with a man of Mr. Hay's stamp, and it is very possible that diplomacy reached its extreme height of straightforwardness, good sense, and mutual confidence when Mr. Hay and Lord Pauncefoot or Sir Michael Herbert met together to discuss and settle the Isthmian Canal, the Alaskan and the Samoan questions. To have wiped three such intricate and contentious issues off the slate would be diplomatic monument enough for one man, even if it stood alone. But the removal of the last of the questions that for generations had kept England and America apart was far from exhausting Mr. Hay's achievements. In English opinion, his chief title to fame will rest on his expansion of the sphere of America's foreign activities. He permanently added the Far East to the list of American interests. He definitely committed his country to the maintenance of the open door in China.

Those are achievements, as England believes, not only important in themselves and now, but far more important for what must flow from them in the future. Mr. Hay, Englishmen assert, found America a world-power on the map and made her a world-power in consciousness, in mental horizon and in the sense of responsibility. They do not believe it will again be possible to revert to the days when America could avow her indifference to whatever the future might hold in store for China and the Far East; and they praise Mr. Hay for having accepted the consequences of the occupation of the Philippines with clear-eyed decisiveness, and for having at once set to work to formulate a conservative but far-reaching Chinese policy. With Chino-American relations, indeed, his name will be preeminently linked. I have heard it more than once declared by Englishmen that the only diplomat who came out of the Boxer troubles with credit was Mr. Hay. That was all the more remarkable as Mr. Hay had no personal knowledge of China, had nothing in the nature of an Asiatic Department to turn to, and was far worse off than his rival negotiators in the matter of "expert advice." Yet he beat them all, by bringing to bear on the problem a detached, unprejudiced and quick-moving mind; and it is well worth recalling, even at this date, how Mr. Hay stood out against the carnival

of executions with which Christendom proposed to appease its wounded dignity; how he opposed the imposition of an overwhelming indemnity, the razing of the Taku forts and the permanent occupation of any portion of Chinese territory; how steadily he set his face against every proposal that smacked of mere aggressiveness; and with what pertinacity and success he used his influence on the side of moderation, humanity and justice. On the whole, that was, perhaps, the most brilliant episode in a career that was full of memorable achievements. It showed precisely that union of practicality with imagination and sympathetic insight that made Mr. Hay so much more than a mere adroit bargainer—made him, in short, a true statesman.

It is believed by those Englishmen who have followed his career, or who met him in London when he was serving on the Alaska Boundary Commission, that Mr. Root, too, has the instincts and perceptions of real statesmanship. He starts in his new office with the heartiest good wishes and the complete confidence of the English governing classes. A decade ago, the advent of a new American Secretary of State meant for England a period of some anxiety. There is now no anxiety whatever. It is taken for granted that, in all that concerns the relations of the two countries, Mr. Root's policy will be Mr. Hay's. England wants no more than that.

A debate in the House of Commons, on Thursday, July 6th, raised one of the most serious questions that can confront a democracy—the question of the position, rights and remuneration of Government employees. The State is, of course, by far the largest employer of labor in the United Kingdom; and, apart from the Army and Navy, the Department of the State with the greatest staff of employees is the Post-office, which in England includes the telegraph services. For a good many years, the Post-office servants have been agitating for an increase of wages and an improvement in the conditions of their work; and, being a well-organized body and able to bring a certain amount of political pressure to bear, they have usually succeeded in getting what they wanted. About ten years ago, for instance, a Parliamentary Committee, appointed to investigate their grievances, increased their wages by \$3,000,000 *per annum*. Five years later, another Committee granted further concessions; but, as the pressure was still maintained, Mr. Austen Chamberlain appointed in

1903—he was then Postmaster-General—a small Committee of five “to inquire into the scale of pay received by postmen, sorters and telegraphists, and to report whether, having regard to the conditions of their employment and to the rates current in other occupations, their remuneration is adequate.” Instead, however, of acting up to the terms of its reference the Committee (known, after its chairman, as the “Bradford Committee”) entirely neglected to compare the wages paid by the Post-office with those obtaining in other employments. In other words, they ignored the one point on which the taxpayer really desired information.

What the average Englishman wants to know is, are postal servants fairly paid, having regard to the pay for corresponding work in the open labor-market?

This question the Bradford Committee made no attempt to answer.

They contented themselves with making a variety of recommendations, which would cost the nation about \$6,500,000; chiefly in increased wages. The Post-office employees, naturally enough, were jubilant over the Committee's Report; and last January sent a deputation to the Postmaster-General (Lord Stanley) to urge its immediate adoption. Lord Stanley, however, in a very straightforward and manly way, told them point-blank that he intended to pay no attention to the Report, which he regarded as inconclusive and incomplete, and that in any recommendations he might make he would be guided solely by the evidence tendered to the Committee. He then proceeded to outline to the deputation the improvements he was contemplating—improvements that would cost the State some \$1,800,000 a year, as against \$6,500,000 proposed by the Bradford Committee and \$12,500,000 asked for by the employees themselves. The deputation did not pretend to be satisfied with the Postmaster-General's answer and threatened to make themselves heard from again.

Since January, this threat has been carried out with an effrontery rare, if not unique, in latter-day English politics. There are 183,000 postal servants, and there are 670 members of the House of Commons. That gives an average of 270 Post-office employees to each seat. In some constituencies, they are said to hold the balance of power; in all they can be organized into a political force that is worth placating. Every M.P., accordingly,

and almost every candidate, has for the past six months been bombarded by letters and circulars, warning him of a determined opposition at the polls unless he votes for the adoption of the Bradford Committee's Report in its entirety. Lord Stanley, during the debate on July 6th, read out to the House an appeal which had been circulated among the Post-office employees for the purpose of bringing pressure on the House of Commons: "Two-thirds, at least, of one political party are in great fear of losing their seats. The swing of the pendulum is against them, and any Member who receives 40 or 50 such letters (*i.e.*, letters from Post-office employees in his constituency) will under present circumstances have to consider very seriously whether on this question he can afford to go into the wrong lobby." Lord Stanley hotly denounced such tactics as "nothing more or less than blackmail," and declared that both parties would have to work together in devising means "by which there should not be this continual blood-sucking on the part of their servants." Nevertheless, 205 Members went into the lobby against him, thus signifying their opinion that the recommendations of the Bradford Committee were entirely reasonable, and that a Department which makes a yearly profit of four or five million pounds ought to refund, say, a million and a half in increased wages to its employees. There is a section of the postal servants which demands that *all* the profits earned by the Department should go into the pockets of the employees, and I see no reason why they should think their goal unattainable under present conditions. Every time the Postal Estimates are discussed in the House, there is a prolonged attempt "to force the Government of the day, against its sober judgment, to spend the public money in raising the pay of its servants."

That is an ominous and disgusting fact, and no escape from its consequences seems possible unless all civil servants on the active list are disfranchised, or unless the conditions of their service, financial and otherwise, are regulated by a quasi-judicial body, independent of Parliament, and beyond the reach of electioneering pressure—a body that would resemble the conciliation and arbitration boards in the industrial world. To some such solution we may have to come. Otherwise, there is a very fair chance that the public employees, municipal as well as State, will gradually eat up the profits of their respective departments.

ST. PETERSBURG, *July, 1905.*

THE disaster at Tsushima which left Russia without a navy and thousands of families without sons, brothers and husbands, made no deep impression either on the fashionable circles of the capital or on the rulers of the Empire. Summer theatres were filled as usual, music-halls were crowded, and the leafy lanes and ornamental waters of the islands drew the usual number of visitors from the dusty streets of the metropolis. In a word, gaiety reigned in the city of the bureaucrats, whose sense of dignity eliminates vulgar emotion for national misfortunes. And, by way of keeping up the illusion, the official journal boldly denied the defeat. Like Philip of Spain, when informed of the destruction of his Armada, the Russian bureaucracy bore the loss with dignified equanimity, and silently made ready to offer up further myriads of lives between Harbin and Vladivostok. Food for cannon is plentiful in Muscovy: the peasants are lambs to obey and tigers to fight, and the patriotism of the Autocracy can bear philosophically the destruction of tens of thousands of mujiks. There are as good fish in the sea as ever came out of it, and ships and guns the Germans and French will readily supply so long as the peasant farmer has any substance or his fields produce wheat and rye. Why then end the war? Mobilization was accordingly carried on in secret, reservists were mustered in the dead of the night and officials informed the country that, Japan being on the eve of bankruptcy, it was meet and proper that the war should be continued with vigor until she suspended payments. The loss of prestige, the loss of money, the loss of human life seemed endurable enough. Nay, far more serious losses than these produced no more lasting impression on Russian officialdom than rain-drops falling on a duck's back. "Try, try, try again," were the only words of comfort uttered to the humiliated nation.

Very different was the effect of the naval disaster upon the Russian people. For it is their blood and money that have been squandered, and it is their future and the well-being of their children that are being recklessly gambled away. They accordingly stiffened their backs and called on the government to desist from further bloodshed. Their spokesmen pointed out that already bankruptcy stared the Autocracy in the face. The war debt is enormous: even if not further increased, it will swallow up the margin between the favorable balance of trade and the growing

service of the foreign loans—the margin which alone renders borrowing possible. And that total sum of indebtedness must of necessity be added to, and very sensibly. For, even if the nation could dispense with a formidable navy, it cannot but build some new battle-ships after the war, while the cost of guns and the expenses incidental to internal reform will absorb tremendous sums. This enormous outlay must be provided for out of the proceeds of fresh taxes or of new loans, whereas the economic condition of the population, impoverished by decades of heartless extortion, calls for a lightening, not an increase, of the crushing burdens. In a word, the economic and financial problems are arduous—almost insoluble, indeed, as things now stand: but, if the war be carried on, they will become veritable sphinx-questions, with ruin as the penalty of failure to answer them. The straits to which the Treasury is reduced are much worse than outsiders generally suspect, and the shifts to which it is tempted to resort give one a glimpse of the hopelessness of the situation. Proposals for mortgaging certain state railways have been entertained, if not accepted, by the Finance Minister; offers for the exploitation of Crown lands and forests are under consideration; while the mites earned by the poor people are surreptitiously appropriated by the authorities and spent—nay, squandered—in the ventures which are precarious from a financial point of view, and ethically reprehensible. The Russian people learned quite lately to its dismay that about twenty million dollars had been asked for and received by a certain M. Balashoff, a comrade of Bezobrazoff's, in order to work the Yalu concession in which Grand-Ducal capital was largely invested. And these twenty millions were, it is further alleged, taken, at Balashoff's express request, from the Savings-Bank and therefore represented the economies of the laboring class which ought to have been inviolable. For this flagrant breach of faith, which is by no means isolated, runs counter to the laws of the Empire and the interests of the Autocracy.

These facts, becoming known, thrilled the people with indignation, and lent force to their demand that the war be stopped. Their representatives assembled in Moscow, passed strong resolutions and asked to be received by the Tsar. At first this request was scouted as presumptuous. They were all misdemeanants, it was argued, having met in defiance of the Imperial commands, founded a newspaper which had to be confiscated, and adopted

resolutions hostile to the régime. Besides, they had no official status and were much too numerous. Other grounds were also adduced in favor of a refusal, but the shrewdest of the Tsar's advisers were for gracious compliance with the reasonable request; and this was finally decided upon. Prince Trubetskoy, the spokesman of the delegation, left no doubt in His Majesty's mind about the views and the feelings of the people. In the Prince's speech a spade was called a spade, and Imperial favorites were alluded to as "presumptive traitors"; "danger to the nation" and "ruin to the dynasty" were included among the contingencies of the near future and the consequences of the present policy, while the monarch was suavisely, almost tearfully, adjured to save his people by convoking their elected representatives. The Tsar's reply is historical and—legendary. This remarkable dialogue between ruler and ruled, between the heaven-sent and the earth-born, sank deep in men's minds, was in fact an event more impressive and exceptional in the domestic affairs of the empire than the annihilation of the navy in its international existence. The condescension of the monarch was a landmark of itself, for it implied the recantation of the autocratic principles which he had hastily laid down on coming to the throne. And what his attitude suggested was amply confirmed by his discourse. The bold initiative and the frank words of his subjects called for and received his cordial thanks. He discerned their motives, he said, and appreciated them; he understood their demands and would concede them. His promise to summon a representative assembly would, therefore, be fulfilled in the spirit as well as the letter, and the sooner and wider this resolve of his was known the better for all concerned. The monarch and the nation must henceforth be one.

The country seemed saved from anarchy, and the danger of civil war was averted. Great, therefore, was the gratitude of his subjects to the Autocrat who had met them half-way. If the grandfather deserved the name of "Emancipator," they said, the grandson merited the title of "Preserver." Preserver of what? Of his own unbounded power and prerogative, answered the courtiers. For after every public utterance of the Monarch comes an official commentary, explaining, restricting, modifying the concessions made; just as after every liberal statute promulgated in the Empire ministerial circulars are issued limiting its scope and sometimes suspending its operation. It is the antidote of reaction

administered after the poison of liberalism. It was thus after each of the ukases or rescripts issued by Nicholas II, ever since the conflicts between himself and his people became acute. "The Tsar giveth, and his Minister taketh away," is the formula. And, in the present case, the statement emanating from the Ministry was peculiarly offensive. The Autocrat's will, it said, never changes: therefore he cannot concede to-day what he refused yesterday. He has never swerved from his express determination to maintain all his rights intact. Therefore, there can be no constitution, no parliamentary government and no such popular institution as the Zemstvos demand. The will of the Tsar is supreme. Nothing, consequently, was or could have been said by His Majesty incompatible with those principles. The newspapers which deny this and seek to lead the people astray must be gagged, and the nation must assimilate the doctrine that the Tsar is and must remain the sole ruler and his will the supreme law.

This "rectification" came like a wintry blast on a sultry day. It froze any warmth of feeling for the Tsar which had been preserved, amid difficulties and doubts, by the most loyal subjects in the world. But many refused to credit the explanations of the officials, which were set down as an afterthought. In truth, Nicholas II must have meant what he said, his words being too clear to admit of diverging constructions. He had yielded to the impulse of the hour. And now his friends were come to save the autocratic principle by compromising the person of the Autocrat. They effectually undermined his credit with his subjects, and now public faith in him is gone: how long he will be mechanically obeyed is a different and a more delicate question.

But the present, however, is no time for mere words, and it behoves the Tsar to act, reveal his policy and lead his people. This, too, he attempted—he or his friends—by secret mobilization, the clandestine roll-call of reservists at night, by awkward ill-advised efforts to raise money for the war. And it was here that his people joined issue with their sovereign. Such a wild outcry against further bloodshed was raised throughout the Empire that its weird echo must have been heard within the palace of Tsarskoe Selo. Peasants, soldiers, officers, journalists, priests, merchants, women, Ministers of State and courtiers indignantly or fervently asked for peace. Even the Tsar's personal friends, men like Prince Meshchersky, declared that the further wanton sacrifice of human

lives would be a crime against every high principle and every respectable interest. The "Russkia Vedomosti," the most moderate and influential journal in all Russia, wrote:

"After a whole series of defeats on land and the destruction of our fleet, which reveal the utter breakdown of our system of government, to persist further in waging war without the slightest chance of success would be an act of madness on which our bureaucracy will hardly venture after having vainly awaited victories which were to save us from domestic troubles."

Another of the Tsar's personal friends, Prince Ukhtomsky, who had always been for the war, gave utterance to mournful lamentations in "The Dawn":

"Without the light of reason, without a definite goal, without faith in to-morrow, we are drifting onwards encircled by phantoms and abysses. The very worst that could befall us has taken place: discrowned on the field of battle, we are as near to bankruptcy in our domestic affairs as in the balance-sheets of foreign politics. . . . Russia is on the eve of unparalleled convulsions. This truth should be proclaimed in loud and ever louder tones before it is too late."

The liberal Russian newspapers published caustic etchings of the men who run the Autocracy. They described the money-grabbers, like Bezobrazoff and Balashoff, who had wormed themselves into the confidence of the Tsar who seems inaccessible to honest men, and had launched Russia on a policy of fatal adventure in the Far East, for which the nation had paid over a milliard roubles before the war and another milliard down to the battle of Tsushima, or say one thousand million dollars. And the result? The loss of Russia's reputation as a Power to be trusted, the loss of her influence among the nations of the globe, the loss of hundreds of thousands of human lives, the impoverishment of scores of millions of men and women, and the enrichment of a few unscrupulous schemers who hide behind Majesty's purple robes. Whatever else may go on, that must cease, people said by way of comment. And this resolve was strengthened by the revelations then published about the doings of the greedy concession-hunters who still enjoy the confidence of the Autocrat.

Nicholas II had raised the dishonest scheme for concession on the Yalu river to the level of a grand national enterprise. He had had twenty million dollars taken from the Savings-Bank and presented to one of the carpetbaggers. And no questions have ever since been asked about the value received, nor the way in which the money was to be expended. "An enterprise of national

importance" it was officially termed, and all the rest was silence. It has been hushed up, like so many other deeds of darkness which will be recorded in Memoirs and Reminiscences trimmed with the embroidery of fiction after the fall of the Autocracy. Other startling disclosures appeared about the way in which the campaign against Japan was carried on, tending to show that the masses are being treated as mere weapons and recklessly shot at the enemy by the privileged few. The Viceroy Alexeieff, for instance, in whose veins the blood of the Romanoffs is believed to circulate, surreptitiously as it were, behaved throughout like an Oriental despot. Travelling in his train, which was a sumptuous palace on wheels, he caused all war traffic to stand still that he might sleep at night and not be disturbed by the shrill whistle of locomotives. In consequence of this precaution, reinforcements destined for the front had to be kept back until his "High Excellency" awoke from his slumbers, while the Japanese pushed unceasingly forward, winning battle after battle. Kuropatkin imitated Alexeieff, Gripenberg followed the example of Kuropatkin, and at last so many cars had been commandeered by the gallant inmates of these luxurious trains that mere officers and passengers had to travel in trucks. "I know cases," writes the "Novoye Vremya" correspondent, "when the authorities were face to face with this dilemma: ought they to convey the wives of certain officers or a number of wounded soldiers? and in two of these cases the preference was given to the ladies." Nay, the very cows of the generals shared the privileges of their august owners, and kept the traffic irregular. One cow hindered the movement of all trains for twelve hours, after which it was comfortably placed. Altogether, the rage for comfortable trains became so great and unreasonable that the generals left the railway line very unwillingly, and seldom without stronger pressure than the still small voice of duty.

In the navy, things were quite as bad. The material of which the ships were built lacked durability: the metal, the boilers, the machinery, were often of inferior quality, because tenders had been accepted less on their own merits than for the attractions which the firms offered. The highest bribe sometimes ensured the acceptance of the least desirable offer and exposed the future crew to needless dangers. Rojestvensky, just as he was about to steam from Libau, received from an express messenger an official warning from the Marine Ministry, informing him that in rough

seas the stability of the "Suvaroff," and other ships of the same type, was much less than it ought to be, and enjoining him to apply such remedies as might suggest themselves, without however allowing the secret to leak out. During the night of the Hull incident, when the windows were opened before the three-inch guns, the waves burst in, flooding men and cannon. In the "Orel," one of the guns got partly filled with water and burst when the next shot was fired. If, in the case of the navy, the interests of the nation had been consulted to the same extent as the comfort of the adventurers who were ruining the nation, the Russian armada would have made a much better show at Tsushima. Every trip of M. Bezobrazoff to the Far East cost \$100,000. He distributed gratuities and loans to his partisans at Port Arthur amounting to a million dollars, while the military authorities there could not raise funds enough to complete the fortifications. And when the Viceroy gave a banquet—in honor of M. Bezobrazoff—a cruiser brought flowers from Japan for the entertainment.

Those are types of the personages, as we now know them, who monopolized the Tsar's confidence and the nation's money and blood. For them no luxury was too costly, no honor too great. Of the manhood which supplied the funds for the campaign and the food for the cannon, we discern admirable samples through the gray mist of official legend. Here is one. In Port Arthur, Joseph Trumpeldor of the 7th Company presented a report of himself in which the following passage occurred: "I have been wounded, and have now only one hand, but it is the right hand. As I should like to go on fighting together with my comrades, I have the honor to ask for a sabre and a revolver." That is the heroism by which empires are built and races ennobled. The regimental order of the day which held up this example for imitation commented upon it thus: "These words ought to be inscribed in letters of gold in the history of the regiment; more particularly because Trumpeldor is a Jew." The man's petition was granted, not however without difficulty. To promote a mere Jew to be a non-commissioned officer amounted to a breach of wholesome tradition. Ultimately, however, it was done; but the writer of the order deemed it necessary to apologize for this departure, in his official report. A man whose religious views differ from those of the Tsar, as Trumpeldor's differed, cannot wash out the stain even in his life-blood, while friendship with the Autocrat such as

was enjoyed by Alexeieff, Bezobrazoff and Balashoff, Kuropatkin and others, operates like charity covering a multitude of sins.

A campaign against Japan under these conditions is really, the press argued, a war of the Autocracy against the people and cannot be brooked. The mobilization ought, therefore, to cease; and, if the ruler will not discontinue it, the people should stop it. This spirit of independence grew; in some places it became a spirit of revolt; and, when the spark fell near Odessa, in Libau and elsewhere, the inflammable stuff caught fire, and internecine strife began. Brother rose up against brother, monarch against people. Blood flowed in the streets of Odessa, as it had flowed in the streets of Nakhichevan; public buildings and private houses were burned, reduced to ashes; the guns of the "Prince Potemkin" opened fire on the city; riots, massacres, free fights accompanied the welter of chaos. Even in England and the United States, as well as in France and Germany, the word "revolution" was at last pronounced in the meaning attached to it since 1789.

Americans and Britons assume that, so long as the troops are willing to use bullets and bayonets, a revolution in Russia is impossible. For the revolutionary centres are far apart, and can never be in close touch with each other, and the masses lack organization. Only if the troops fraternize with the population is there any real danger to the Autocrat. That view of the situation is, I submit, open to question. Even if it were quite certain that Nicholas II will never willingly share his power with his people, it would not follow that the only hope of constitutional government is in a revolt of the soldiery. The Russians themselves hold that a general rising of the peasants might be a much more terrible, but not less effective, means of accomplishing the needed change, but they do not desire it. The abdication of Nicholas II might lead to a maximum of reform with a minimum of national discomfort. Public opinion in the Tsardom—such public opinion as recent events have called into being—favors this last solution, but leaves its application to Fate. Nicholas II is no longer the Little Father of his people. What the ancient Hebrews termed the glory of Jahveh has departed from him. He seems stricken with psychical palsy. What he gives with one hand, he abstracts with the other; what he affirmed yesterday, he denies to-day; what might be a beneficent choice, he leaves until it becomes a baleful necessity. So long, therefore, as he reigns, bureaucracy and its

intolerable plagues will rule and ruin the nation, and for this reason public opinion hopes and prays for his abdication. It is he alone who refuses to conclude peace: he alone who rejects the demand for a constitution under which he would wield more real power than as nominal Autocrat, and it is he only who sacrifices the lives of his best subjects, in order to perpetuate a system of corruption and iniquity which only Russians would have borne with so patiently and so long. How then will order be evolved from chaos?

If the army prove faithful and Nicholas remain obstinate, the Zemstvos may possibly become enterprising enough to call upon the intelligent classes to give no assistance, and on the peasants to pay no taxes, to the Government of the Tsar. But, whatever turn affairs may take, it is obvious that the Russian people is in revolution, and that the Autocrat, as champion of a corrupt bureaucracy, is playing a losing game.

BERLIN, *July, 1905.*

WHAT are the real aims of Germany in foreign politics? With the professed object of returning an "effective" answer to this question, Mr. Arnold White, not long since, decided "to take off the gloves and write of things as they really are, not as they seem to be under the banal conventions of a jejune journalism."

The picture Mr. White draws of Germany would be heartrending if it were correct. He tells us that the food of the poorer classes is "not only unappetizing but abominable," that the working classes "herd like animals," that children "frequently commit suicide" owing to the tendency to "militarize everything," that the Army is drifting towards decadence and the Empire towards bankruptcy, that the bureaucrats are overbearing, the rich Jews insolent, and the aristocracy arrogant, that advanced thought is dying out, that the providence of the State is but a "pitiless travesty," and that the great bulk of the population is discontented. The authorities, he adds, represent Great Britain's hostility as the origin of all this mischief. Can Mr. White have fallen a victim to the "April fool" journalism of Germany? German writers cast dignity to the winds on the one day in the year when they are privileged to fool their readers. Foreign

journalists have succumbed more than once to this curious custom of travestyng facts, and have telegraphed to the four corners of the earth the portentous announcements which regularly appear in the German press on April 1st.

It is, for instance, far from being the case that "the petty war in West Africa" has disorganized the Imperial finances, for the necessity of reforming those finances was recognized many years before the outbreak of the Herero and Hottentot revolts. The question is one not of bankruptcy, nor of inevitable deficits, but merely of reorganization. Numerous and abundant sources of revenue are still untapped in the German Empire. Neither tobacco nor spirits are as heavily taxed as they are, for instance, in Great Britain. Legacies are practically unburdened. The Imperial Secretary of the Treasury, when he introduces his Bill for the Reform of the Finances next autumn, will be at no loss to show that Germany is capable of sustaining the expenses of the Empire without any excessive straining of her resources. Some of the smaller States, it is true, have suffered keenly from the existing system of finance, and it is mainly in their interest that the pressure of taxation is to be differently distributed; but the larger States, with the exception of Saxony, are in a condition of enviable prosperity. No less than two-thirds of the national debt of Prussia is in the form of capital invested in railways and other profit-making concerns, which are paying large dividends and are lightening very materially the weight of taxation. As to the social legislation of the Empire, it is far from "crumbling to its doom," but is being systematically developed, and raised slowly but surely to higher standards of usefulness. So much is admitted even by the Social Democrats, who are unconsciously undergoing a process of transformation from a party of dogmatic revolutionaries into a political organization with very positive and practical ideas of reform. Loudly as the Social Democrats may rant, the fact remains that they are secretly proud of the degree of civilization achieved by the German Empire. Involuntarily they acknowledged this at the time of the Königsberg trial, when they dwelt furiously on the disgrace to the Empire, implied by the comparison of its legal conditions with those prevailing in Russia. Undoubtedly much misery exists in Germany, as it does in Great Britain and the United States, but the manner in which its rulers are grappling with the problems of poverty should be,

and is, a cause of emulation, and not of ignorant condemnation, to the administrators and publicists of other lands. Not misery, however, but increasing prosperity, leading to greater comfort and happiness, is the cardinal feature of an Empire where the Savings-Bank deposits of the working classes are accumulating at a more rapid rate even than in the United Kingdom.

Mr. White asserts that "the overbearing behavior of the military and of the bureaucrats" is "intolerable." To whom? The German people are vastly different from the British and American. They love freedom less than "order"—for "*Ordnung muss sein*"—and are filled with anything but hatred of the bureaucrats, who taken as a whole are a remarkably able and enlightened set of men. "Red tape" the bureaucrats, of course, waste in alarming quantities, though after a residence of ten years in the country I have come to the conclusion that they employ less of it than was formerly the case. They are, moreover, keenly sensitive to public opinion, to a decided expression of which they invariably defer. Of deep-rooted hatred of the "bureaucrats" there is no trace. Has Mr. White never made the acquaintance of that indignant German who left England after a sojourn of three months, because in all that time not a single policeman had troubled to inquire the object of his visit, the number of his dwelling, and the date of his birth? That man, who is a typical German, cherishes a profound contempt for England as a country where there is no Government, and no care is taken of the individual. As for the Army, it is, despite the admitted evils of militarism, which no one wishes to deny, still the pride of the nation. Universal military service cannot fairly be described as unpopular in Germany. It has conferred untold benefits, both of an educational and physical character on the people, who, while loving peace, glory in the constant readiness of their country for war.

But though the nation and its rulers are conscious of possessing in the Army an almost perfect instrument for defensive and offensive operations, they are wholly innocent of the crime of wanton aggression. The history of the German Empire in the last thirty-five years is a magnificent record of progress in the peaceful occupations of industry, science and internal consolidation.

Mr. White says that the Jews are "omnipotent" in Prussia and that the Jews want a war that will deflect the ambitions of the

Emperor from the German provinces of Austria. Are the Jews then military men? Despite the fearful power which, according to Mr. White, they wield in the councils of the Emperor, they have not yet succeeded in gaining admission for a solitary member of their race into the commissioned ranks of the German Army. In Austria matters bear a very different aspect. There the Jews are not excluded from the Army. Some of them—witness General Popper and General Schweitzer—have even risen to exalted rank. Anti-Semitism in Austria is of a religious rather than of an economic and political character. It is fomented mainly by the Clericals, and does not seriously damage the business prospects of the sons of Israel. To contend that the Austrian Germans, if incorporated with the German Empire, would destroy the omnipotence of Jewry is therefore erroneous, if for no other reason than that the Jews, so far from being omnipotent, are politically almost impotent in Germany. Even the great Banking Houses have been “baptized,” and it is with the “baptized” houses that the State has its dealings.

As for the German ambition to “find an outlet on the shores of the Adriatic,” it is to be met with, if at all, among the Pan-Germans, who really are not the “bloodthirsty” creatures they sometimes represent themselves to be. What they aim at, in the event of the break-up of the Dual Empire, is the association of its German provinces in a kind of federal union with the German Empire. But, so far as the German Government is concerned, that is a consummation by no means to be devoutly wished; for it must not be forgotten that the Austrian Germans are Roman Catholics and that the Roman Catholic element has already assumed formidable proportions in the political life of Germany. In the Reichstag the black-coated “Centrum” is the strongest party. If the forces of that party were to be recruited by the votes of millions of Austrians the religious equilibrium of Germany would be entirely upset, and the Hohenzollern Empire as a great Protestant Power would practically cease to exist. The Pan-Germans have endeavored to overcome this difficulty by suggesting that the Austrian provinces shall not be represented in the Reichstag, but shall be included in the military and tariff systems of Germany. But the Government would not approve even of this form of union, which would signify the definite abandonment of the rest of Austria to the Slavonic races. Hence it is that we find an

authoritative exponent of the views cherished by the Emperor William exclaiming in this month's "*Deutsche Revue*" that, if it should ever become necessary, Germany would fight, not to dismember, but to preserve the integrity of Austria.

The German Emperor has never harbored the design of attacking Holland. His closest advisers are convinced that aggressive action against the Netherlands would be not only criminal, but diametrically opposed to the best interests of Germany, which is too much embarrassed by her Poles, Danes, Alsatians, and Guelphs to cherish any longings for the inclusion within her borders of another five millions of irreconcilables. The aim of German policy is rather to convince the Dutch that Germany is desirous of protecting them and their colonies from the aggressive schemes of other lands. So far the Dutch have viewed the advances of Germany with suspicion, and have refused to enter into closer relations with their mighty neighbor even for postal purposes. The Pan-Germans hope ultimately to convert them to a more appreciative sense of the benefits to be derived from an alliance and a tariff union with the Empire; and there is small room for doubt that the propaganda enjoys the secret encouragement of the Government. But from a campaign of persuasion to one of force is a far cry.

The German Emperor, in the fifteen years of his reign, has at all events shown absolutely no symptoms of a desire to adopt buccaneering principles.

It was shown in a former communication to these columns that the Kaiser has watched with a sense of growing irritation the endeavors made by more than one foreign statesman to isolate Germany in the councils of Europe. That irritation has not yet developed into nervousness. Indeed in his latest oration to the world the German monarch expressly stated that he was determined that the bayonets and guns of his Army should never be employed in warfare so long as the honor of Germany remained unassailed. He had sworn a solemn oath, he added, that he would not strive to acquire the barren glory that results from wanton conquests. Upon that promise, which was made to the world, I am convinced the world may rely.

If the peace of Europe is endangered at all, the menace is due to the alarming growth, both in Great Britain and Germany, of the vice of national intolerance and rancor.

WASHINGTON, *July, 1905.*

THE month of July, 1905, will be marked in the records of our State Department by the decease of Secretary Hay and the accession of Secretary Root, as the month of August will be remembered as that in which the conference of the plenipotentiaries of Japan and Russia at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, bore witness to the success of an American President's interposition for the purpose of terminating a war in the Far East. The foreign diplomatists, who have watched at Washington Mr. Hay's conduct of our exterior relations, have had a view-point sufficiently detached to be good judges of his aims and his achievements, and for that reason it is probable that their contemporary verdict forecasts the judgment of the historian. They have been too close to one of the *foci* of international activities to make the mistake committed by some American daily newspapers, which have credited to the late Secretary some performances with which he had nothing to do, and they do not shut their eyes to the fact that the things which he actually accomplished fell considerably short of his hopes and his intentions. They know, for example, what some journalists seem disposed to overlook, that Mr. Hay was neither the first nor the second Secretary of State under the McKinley Administration, and that, being at the time the Ambassador of the United States at the Court of St. James's, he took no part in the framing of the protocol which stopped hostilities between the United States and Spain, or in negotiating subsequently at Paris the definite treaty of peace. When Mr. Hay assumed the headship of the State Department the Spanish War was a thing of the past. There was no lack, however, of important problems to solve. There was, for example, the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, which, for half a century, had been apparently an insuperable impediment to the cutting of an interoceanic waterway through the American isthmus, because it seemed scarcely expedient or reasonable that the United States should construct at their own expense a canal, of the commercial or strategic advantages of which our country would be only a joint beneficiary. Mr. Hay's tenancy of the State Department will long be associated, in the American public mind, with the supersession of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty by a convention which assured to us on the Isthmus benefits and privileges commensurate with the burdens and responsibilities which we assumed. The fact, however, will

not be lost sight of by the foreign diplomatists stationed at Washington that the existing substitute for the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty is not the document originally framed by Mr. Hay, for that the Senate refused to ratify. On the contrary, it is an instrument deliberately contrived to meet the objections advanced by certain influential Senators, and, therefore, it may be accurately described rather as an outcome of Senate criticism than as an embodiment of the compact to which Mr. Hay and Lord Pauncefote originally set their names. Nor are the representatives of France and other European Governments, or the agents of the British colony of Newfoundland, likely to forget that Mr. Hay failed to secure the Senate's sanction of reciprocity treaties, which had his own cordial approval. It must also be owned that Mr. Hay's exemplary desire to make his country a prime mover in the elimination of war, by committing it to a series of arbitration treaties, was not destined to know fruition because it encountered obstruction in the Senate. After all allowances, however, have been made by first-hand and impartial observers, for the considerable gap between what he strove to do and what he actually did, it will cheerfully be acknowledged that Mr. Hay's occupation of the Department of State under parts of two administrations was distinguished by three events which reasonably may be looked upon as landmarks in the history of American diplomacy. We refer to the creation of an intimate understanding between the United States and Great Britain, less definite, of course, but, perhaps, not less trustworthy and fruitful, than a formal treaty; to the enunciation of the far-reaching and epoch-making Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine; and to the arraying of the physical power and moral influence of the United States on the side of the political independence and territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire. Whether we look at the startling novelty or momentous consequences of these State strokes, we cannot but testify that the author of them is qualified to challenge a place of eminence among the tenants of the State Department.

When Mr. Hay exchanged the embassy to the Court of St. James's for the office of Secretary of State,—an exchange which had not been made since it was made by James Buchanan—and began the *rapprochement* between the United States and Great Britain, which is justified by a community, not only of race, language and sentiment, but, above all, of interest, only about two

years had elapsed since Mr. Cleveland's Venezuela Message had given Englishmen a shock of indignation and disgust. It is hard for Americans, now that they are thoroughly awakened, on the one hand, to the sincerity of Venezuela's gratitude, and, on the other, to the value of England's cooperation in the Far East and elsewhere, to understand how it was possible for Mr. Cleveland's Message to evoke an impulsive, instantaneous, fervid, and almost unanimous chorus of approbation from citizens of the United States. The fact that, if a similar declaration were put forth to-day, with the same ostensible intention of plunging this country into war with England for the sake of compelling a submission to arbitration of a petty dispute concerning the boundary of a mongrel Latin-American commonwealth, would probably meet with a different reception, may be attributed to three causes: first, to the forbearance and magnanimity with which Lord Salisbury, rather than accept the responsibility for war with a kindred people, sacrificed his personal dignity and pride by assenting quickly to an arbitration which previously he had repelled; secondly, to the unstinted sympathy which Americans encountered in England during the recent war with Spain, and which, compared with the rancorous dislike exhibited to them at the time in Continental Europe, had the effect of an oasis in the desert; and, thirdly, to a recognition of the truth that, since events have compelled us to give hostages to fortune in Porto Rico, the Panama Canal strip, Hawaii, Guam and the Philippines, the friendship of the greatest naval Power on earth has become to us of very great importance, if not indispensable. It is to the abiding credit of Secretary Hay that these reasons for a reversal of our former attitude toward Great Britain swayed his mind and shaped his course from the moment that he assumed control of our State Department. What was a purely instinctive, and might possibly have been a fugitive, tendency became in his hands an avowed, a deliberate and probably an unchangeable policy—unchangeable, at all events, so long as the British people shall exhibit the appreciative and propitiatory spirit which was exemplified in the attitude of the British member of the Court which decided the Alaska Boundary controversy.

Mr. Hay's occupation of the State Department was indisputably contemporaneous with President Roosevelt's formulation and practical application of his new interpretation of the duty im-

posed by the Monroe Doctrine on the United States, as regards their relation to Latin-American republics. The Monroe Doctrine, as formerly construed, laid upon us an obligation toward the Latin-American commonwealths alone; it held us in no wise responsible for the delinquencies of which they might be guilty toward European Powers. That is to say, the Monroe Doctrine placed us in the anomalous and illogical position of the guardian of a minor, who protects his ward from being sued personally, but refuses to be sued in his place and stead. Mr. Roosevelt took the logical ground that if we say to European Powers, "You shall not enforce the liquidation even of just claims against a Latin-American debtor by the confiscation of the debtor's territory, or by any other measure calculated to affect the debtor's destiny," we must also hold ourselves accountable for the non-commission by our ward of acts that might be punished, and perhaps could only be effectually punished, by confiscation of territory, if committed by non-American nations. The announcement of this new conception of our international duty was made by Mr. Roosevelt soon after his perception of the possible irreconcilability with the Monroe Doctrine of the blockade of Venezuelan seaports by European creditor Powers, and the subsequent temporary sequestration of the customs revenues of La Guayra and Puerto Cabello for the benefit of the creditors concerned. He then announced the principle, and he has since applied it by agreeing to exercise, pending the ratification of a treaty to that effect with the Dominican Republic, the functions of collector and distributor of the customs revenues of Santo Domingo. Now, it can have escaped no close observer that Secretary Hay, personally, took no part in the defence of this novel graft upon the original Monroe Doctrine, which defence, on the contrary, was left to President Roosevelt himself and to Mr. Root, then Secretary of War. Neither are attentive readers of influential newspapers likely to have overlooked a letter of Secretary Hay's, which was posthumously printed in "The Sun," from which it is an unavoidable inference that the rejection by the United States Senate of the treaty authorizing our Government to collect and distribute the customs revenues of the Dominican Republic would have been witnessed by the writer without an atom of regret. We are justified, therefore, in assuming that the late Secretary of State tolerated, rather than originated, what has come to be

known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. He did not publicly protest against it; much less did he emphasize his remonstrance by a resignation of his office. It follows that, as history is written, the proclamation of a policy which may have for the New World momentous consequences is likely enough to be credited to Mr. Hay's administration of the State Department.

Whatever may have been Mr. Hay's personal relations to the new and discursive exposition of the Monroe Doctrine, there is no doubt that he merits all or most of the honor for the wise, unselfish and high-minded position taken by the United States with reference to China's future. When Chinese and other Oriental witnesses come to be heard at the bar of history, there can be no doubt as to the verdict that will be passed upon the monstrously inordinate pecuniary indemnity extorted by the allied Powers from the poverty-stricken Peking Government for the so-called Boxer outrages, which, in the then anarchic condition of the Middle Kingdom, it was scarcely possible to prevent. There is, however, but little doubt that, but for the unprovoked and inexcusable attack of most of the allied fleet on the Pei-ho forts—an attack in which American war-vessels took no part—the troops at the disposal of the Peking Government could have been relied upon to prevent the siege of the foreign legations. It will be remembered that our State Department gave no credit to the lying report which, telegraphed from Shanghai, gave a detailed account of the alleged capture of the legations and the massacre of their inmates. The discreet, circumspect and merciful conduct of the American contingent in the allied force that occupied Peking presented an edifying contrast to the rapacity and brutality exhibited by the Russians and some other European participants in the expedition. So, too, the bill for damages submitted by Mr. Hay to the Peking Government was a model of moderation and decency, compared with the shameless greed betrayed by most of the copartners in the allied demonstration. The same considerate and equitable spirit was displayed by our State Department with regard to the currency in which the indemnity was to be discharged, and to the other conditions of payment. Eventually, when Russia, which had seized the pretext of the Boxer outrages to occupy with her soldiers all three of the Manchurian provinces, showed plainly a disposition to keep them there for an indefinite period, Mr. Hay took the lead in demanding that the St. Peters-

burg Government should fix a date for the evacuation of Manchuria, and procured a more or less willing assent from all of the treaty Powers to the self-denying ordinance framed at Washington, whereby the signatories abjured any intention of impairing the political independence or mutilating the territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire. To appreciate the significance, and, we might add, the humor, of this covenant, we should recall what had been done only, so to speak, the day before, by some of the subscribers to the unwelcome compact—by Russia, for instance, which, under the guise of a lease, had wrenched from China the Liao-tung peninsula, and manifestly intended to keep possession of the whole of Manchuria; by Germany, which had seized the harbor and district of Kiao-Chao; by Great Britain, which had grasped Wei-hai-wei in the province of Shan-tung, and a strip of the Cantonese mainland opposite Hong-Kong; and by France, which had made encroachments on the frontier of Yun-nan. We alone asked for nothing; would accept nothing; and when China, in her hour of weakness, found herself begirt by despoilers, we stood forth her only friend. For our assumption of that magnificent, because just and magnanimous, position, the future compiler of our diplomatic history will have to thank Secretary Hay.

There is no reason to suppose that President Roosevelt or Mr. Root, the new Secretary of State, has the slightest desire to depart by a hair's breadth from the well-conceived and honor-conferring lines traced for our foreign policy by the late John Hay, so far as Great Britain and China are concerned. Under the future administration of the State Department, we may expect to witness a sincere, intelligent and an effective effort to cement a fruitful friendship with Great Britain, and to perform the laudable functions of a champion of equity in China. As for the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, Mr. Root has been, next to the President himself, its most conspicuous, authoritative and eloquent advocate, and we may therefore take for granted that he will make the best of it.